Articles/Comments The Two Faces of the Terrorist: The State and Non-State Actors

The Two Faces of the Terrorist: The State and Non-State Actors



By: Mohd. Musib M. Buat

(A paper presented at the symposium on the “Unmasking the Terrorist”, sponsored by the Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines , U.P.NISMED, Diliman, Quezon City, September 9,2004).

The Officer-in- charge, Dr.Cynthia Neri Zayas, distinguished Speakers and participants:

My thanks and appreciation to the organizers of this symposium for inviting me and sharing with you my thoughts and ideas on the subject of terrorism. The title of the symposium, “ Unmasking the terrorist”, is very timely and opportune in reminiscing the attack on the World Trade Center at New York City, U.S.A on September 11, 2001.

Indeed, the so-called U.S. war on Terror has taken on a new face and is currently changing the relations between nations and countries. Peoples and nations are caught in a dilemma in responding to the call of U.S President Bush: “You are either with us or (you are with the Terrorists)?” However, the basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force against a faceless enemy, as the most recent one by the United States on a sovereign country like Iraq, is the absence of an agreed or precise legal definition of terrorism. One remarkable confusion as one writer points out is the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals. (1) This dilemma is exemplified by the saying: “One country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter.” The lack of consistency or apparent contradiction in the use of the term “terrorism” may be borne by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements like Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habid Bourquiba in Tunisia, and Ahmad Ben Bella in Algeria, among others, were originally labeled as terrorists by regimes they had opposed but later were internationally recognized as statesmen.

During the Philippine Revolution our own revolutionary leaders or reformers like Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Aguinaldo, Apolinario Mabini, Jose Rizal, to mention a few, were labeled by the Spaniards as insurrectos, filibuster, bandidos, etc. but they are now emulated as great Filipino heroes. Thus, “the rebels of today are the heroes of tomorrow.” This will similarly apply to the Bangsa Moro rebel leaders when their dream of an independent Moro homeland will become a reality.

Definition of Terrorism

Under the present unipolar international relations, one of the basic slogans in justifying the use of force against certain states and groups operating internationally is the “fight against terrorism”. Since “terrorism” is perceived as a transnational crime, the war against terrorism must likewise be borderless. We are living in an unpredictable world where one dominant power who plays the role of a world policeman makes the rules. What then has become of the world body, the United Nations Organization and its organs- that of a fait accompli or a subservient body? What happened in Central Europe in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is too recent to recall. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) merely played the role of a fait accompli.

The lists of states “sponsoring terrorism” and terrorist organizations are drawn up and constantly updated according to criteria totally unknown to the public but merely dictated by strategic interest, according to Hans Koechler. What is therefore the defining criteria for terrorist acts as distinguished from legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense? The United Nations since the time of the Cold War has been grappling in vain to come up on the basic definition of terrorism. However, despite efforts, it has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who adhere to the legitimate use of force in resisting foreign oppression or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a particular state. (2)

The international community is faced by the dilemma by reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a terrorist group for Israel and liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims, the Kashmiri resistance groups who are perceived by India as terrorists and liberation fighters by Pakistan, the Contras in Nicaragua as freedom fighters for the United States, and terrorists for the Socialist group, and most recently the Afghani Mujahedeen (who later become the Taliban movement). During the Cold War period the latter were freedom fighters for the West, supported by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. The lists of conflicting categorization that cannot be reconciled would be long to enumerate and the reason for these opposing categorizations are dictated by political interest being the roots of these perceptions. The divergent interest of states, says Koechler, is the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies in definitions and perceptions. It depends on whether a state is in a position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a particular territory, the definition of terrorism will accordingly fluctuate.

It is primarily due to these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed group or movement (non-state-actor), labeled as terrorist-freedom fighter that made the United Nations unable to reach a precise definition of terrorism. The result is a “policy of double standards” in international affairs, says Koechler. This “definitional predicament” has become more serious in the present unipolar relations when one superpower exercises decisional role in the Security Council while other former great powers of the Cold War era has become marginalized. The problem has become more acute since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. (3)

Neither could we find a precise definition of terrorism to come up with a consistent anti-terrorism policy in the various conventions and resolutions of the United Nations. Due to this lack of consensus among member states on the basic criteria defining terrorism, there exist only implicit or operative definitions of terrorism. The unresolved dilemma is summed up in the formula, according Koechler, “terrorism versus national liberation”. Examples of “operative” definitions are numerous. Under Art.5 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), terrorist acts are considered as “criminal acts…, in particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke state of terror in the general public or a group of persons or particular persons,”...; that those acts - “are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.”

Another operative definition is found in General Assembly resolution 54/110 of February 2000 which describe terrorism in the sense of “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, group of persons or particular persons for political reasons.”

The United Nations General Assembly resolution 51/210 of December 17, 1996 established an AD HOC Committee task “to elaborate on international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings”. The committee since its establishment has been working on a comprehensive international treaty on terrorism, but failed to draw up one to date. The Committee Chairman, Rohan Perera (Sri Lanka) reported that Art.2 of the draft convention on the definition of terrorism and Art.18 concerning acts of “armed forces” or “parties” to a conflict and reference to “ foreign occupation“ could not be agreed upon by the committee members. There was therefore no consensus reached covering who would be entitled to exclusion from the draft treaty’s scope. The exemption of national liberation movements was a delicate question. The members of the committee took into account the concerns of the member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), with particular regard to the status of the Palestinian Liberation Organization which could not be reconciled with the views of the groups of the Western states. Thus, the divergent political interests and contradicting normative perceptions cannot be reconciled by mere reference to the universal principles of human rights as forming part of jus cogens of general international law. (4)

In an address by the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan before the General Assembly on October 1, 2001, he acknowledged that the definition of terrorism as one most difficult issue brought before the world organization and that he admits and accepts “the need for legal precision”. (5) The Secretary-General pointed to the existing body of norms of international humanitarian law providing that even in situations of armed conflict, the targeting of innocent civilians is illegal.”(6) Indeed, the binding norms of international humanitarian law may give a useful hint on how to bridge the gap in the opposing views concerning the definition of terrorism as a crime, observes Koechler.

Towards a Comprehensive Definition of Terrorism

A comprehensive definition of terrorism, including the binding measures in the use of force by means of integration into existing instruments of international humanitarian law necessarily requires a precise legal definition of the term ”terrorism”. That such definition must likewise include a clear distinction between criminal acts of terrorism and acts of resistance against foreign occupation and/or of national liberation movements. The principle of “unity of normative knowledge” enunciated in Hans Kelsen’s theory of international law must be adhered to particularly in regard to the necessity to place regulations concerning terrorist as in a normative framework generally acceptable. The norms of international humanitarian law as those laid dawn in the Geneva Conventions and the norms defining and regulating terrorism as an offense have to be harmonized to avoid a “policy of double standards.” Basic legal rules related to politically motivated violent acts against civilians should be harmonized to make it legally consistent to include the term “state terrorism” in the general definition of terrorism. (7)

The common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and particularly the Fourth General Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 may be equally applied to acts of politically motivated violence in a no-war situation, irrespective of whether of an international or national situation. For a comprehensive approach, Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Convention for the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (1977) should also be applied. Article 13(2) provides: “The civilian populations as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among civilian population are prohibited”.

As early as 1987, this approach was advocated in the International Progress Organization’s Geneva Declaration on Terrorism.(8) This was an effort towards a comprehensive definition of acts involving states, groups and individuals on the international and national level. This comprehensive approach, observes Koechler, is compatible with and even complementary to the UN General Assembly concerns on the principle of self-determination and the “inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples… under foreign occupation” resulting therefrom, with the consequence of “upholding the legitimacy of… struggle of national liberation movements’ (resolution 46/15 of 9th of December 1991).” The unified approach suggested must be in conformity with the spirit of General Assembly resolutions, acts of national resistance that will not be criminalized per se but will be judged in consonance to the same rules as acts of regular warfare by a national army. In this way, both state and non-state actors shall be held by the same standards of international rules of humanitarian law. It is also possible to bridge the existing gap between the normative perceptions of the group of Islamic states on one hand, and the western states on the other hand. It was the opposing views of the two groups that prevented reaching a compromise on the issue of definition of terrorism that was proposed by Australia in the AD HOC Committee of the General Assembly earlier in November 2001.

It should, however, be made clear that resistance or national liberation movements under such codification effort must in no way resort to terrorist tactics and that a politically legitimate aim does not necessarily justify the means. Under the unified framework system of international humanitarian law, terrorist methods will be punishable irrespective of the specific political purpose, and irrespective of whether those acts are committed by liberation movements or regular armies of existing regimes. The dilemma faced by the General Assembly AD HOC Committee could be solved on the basis of the comprehensive approach.

The issue of exempting certain groups fighting foreign occupation will no longer be an issue because groups fighting foreign occupation or liberation movements will be subject to the same rules defined for the behavior of states in the Geneva Convention of 1949 from the application of the proposed anti-terrorism convention. Both the military and non-military groups, state and non-state actors (even without a formally declared war) will be subject to the same standards or rules. (9)

On the other hand, the central and unresolved question is still: who has the “power of definition”? Under the unipolor system, it is even more difficult to resolve the underlying conflicts of interests between member states in the world organization, the United Nations.

Suggested Conditions for a Consistent Anti-Terrorist Policy of the United Nations

It is suggested by Koechler that the United Nations can only establish a cohesive anti-terrorist strategy based on the rule of law and on the provisions of its charter if the following conditions are meet, to wit:

· Existing legal standards and conventions are integrated into a universal system of norms that serves as ‘common denominator’ for the respective sub-system, or – vice-versa- if a comprehensive convention on terrorism eventually to be adopted by the General Assembly is being integrated into the existing set of norms of international humanitarian law;

· particular interests of member states , including the most powerful ones, are effectively held in check in the negotiating process leading to the adoption of an international convention;

· an institution of an “international arbiter” is created in regard to sanctions and penalties to be imposed on the basis of such a convention, and if this body is able to act in an independent, objective and unbiased manner (similar to the International Court of Justice’s mode of operation); (and)

· the veto privilege of the permanent members of the Security Council is abolished so as to allow an international arbiter to act in complete independence and without interference from the “executive branch” of the United Nations.” (10)

The reason for the last condition is based on the observation that up to the present, the veto privilege has in fact granted de facto, though not de jure immunity to many violators of international humanitarian law, even to perpetrators of state terrorism. This is so because of the simple procedural rule that no enforcement action could be done if the perpetrator of the violation is a permanent member of the Security Council or its ally. (11) Such state of affairs have demoralized the international community with respect to the requirements of universal law enforcement, whether against states or individuals. The International Criminal Court (ICC) should be entrusted with the jurisdiction in cases of terrorism committed by states or non-states when it becomes operational. But when will it become operative? As of August 31, 2001 there were 139 signatures and 37 parties. Under Art.126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it will enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. The present efforts towards a comprehensive codification of norms on terrorism is highlighted by the persistent opposition of the United States to the creation and coming into force of the Statute of Rome and the US administration is even threatening sanctions against states intending to ratify the Statute of Rome. But if we truly believe in the United Nations as the universal guarantor of the rule of law and in the global community, there is no other alternative for a comprehensive, unified and universal codification, as discussed above.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) The International Criminal Court (ICC) will be a permanent independent judicial body created by the International Community through the Rome Statute. It has the power to prosecute the gravest crimes under international law such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Unlike the International Court of Justice (ICJO) which deal with states, its main distinctive feature is that the ICC deals with and has the power to investigate, prosecute and convict individuals. It is a permanent body based in the Hague unlike the ad hoc tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. It came about on July 17, 1998 when one hundred and twenty (120) States voted in support of the Final Text of the Rome Statute seeking to establish the International Criminal Court. About twenty-one (21) States abstained and seven (7) voted against it, among them the United States, China, Japan, India and Israel. By December 2000, the deadline set for signing of the Statute, 139 countries have signed including the Philippines and USA. Reportedly, President Arroyo has not yet endorsed the instrument to the Senate for ratification; while the Bush administrations as of May 2, 2002 remained un-signed. On April 11, 2002, ten (10) States simultaneously deposited their instruments of ratification at the UN headquarters in New York, crossing the threshold of 60 ratifications necessary for the Rome Statute to enter into force which was supposed to be last July 2002.

According to the ICRC, “Armed conflicts inevitably give rise to abusive behavior, and the forces directly involved in the hostilities are not the only ones to suffer the consequences.” Military actions often hurt innocent civilians while the perpetrators are often protected by their state or remain powerful enough to avoid conviction in their national territory. It is only by holding individuals accountable for violations of international law will the global community be able to deal effectively with the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. This is crucial because it will aid both present victims and to deter future criminals. Thus, in countries where the courts are incapable of dealing with individual violations of international humanitarian law, the ICC could step in. Such a court could deter future dictators from killing their own nationals. On the other hand, the maintenance of international peace would greatly benefit from the existence of the ICC. While it is true that UN peacekeepers can sometimes stop wholesale slaughter by placing themselves between warring factions, we have seen that in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and other places, the hatred that fuels the violence does not just go away after the shooting stops. The cycle of violence continues so long as the people involved feel that justice has not been served. We saw this in East Timor.

The various principles of international law and criminal law also govern the ICC. These are:

“a. Non-retroactivity of the Statute. Only crimes committed after the Statute is in force will be cognizable by the ICC. This means that crimes committed under the Marcos regime cannot be prosecuted under the ICC.

b. No impunity such as statutes of limitation should be permitted, non-amnesties, pardons, immunity of officials, or similar measures of impunity should be recognized.

c. Trials must be fair, and should observe due process.

d. Non-imposition of the death penalty. The Court may order compensation or reparation of the victims.

e. Protection for victims and witnesses.”(12)

The establishment of the ICC is one hope for justice when one cannot have justice in his own country since it has jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of heinous crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Ironically, the Philippines has not yet ratified as far as we know the Rome Statute for the ICC. President Estrada had signed the Rome Statute for the ICC on December 28, 2000. It has been stuck and long awaiting action under the Arroyo administration. A Senate resolution is reportedly waiting but the instrument for ratification is not yet in the Senate. Meantime, the United States has been exerting efforts to seek exemption from the ICC. This must have influenced the Arroyo government for inaction?

If the US is not a State party of the Rome Statute and has renounced the court, it will not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction and will not submit to any of its orders. In cases of crimes covered by the court are committed by any American soldier or official and they are not prosecuted domestically or by the US, the victims or aggrieved party will have no other venue for redress. The award of US$1.9 billion in civil and moral damages by the Court of Hawaii for martial law victims remains unenforced. Since the ICC has universal jurisdiction, the ICC will be the only hope of the Martial law victims to facilitate the enforcement of the judgment of the Hawaii court.

Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the ICC

“The Court will deal with the most serious crimes committed by individuals: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. These crimes are specified in the Statute and are carefully defined to avoid ambiguity and vagueness. Crimes of aggression will also be dealt with by the Court when State Parties have agreed on the definition, elements, and conditions under which the Court will exercise jurisdiction.

a. Genocide is any one of a number of acts aimed at the destruction of all or part of certain groups of people. It is this intent that distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity.

Under Article 6 of the Statute, the following five prohibited acts-if committed with the intention to destroy “in whole or part” a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, may constitute genocide:

· killing members of the group;

· causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to the members of a group;

· deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part;

· imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group;(and)

· forcibly transferring children of a group to another group.

Under Article 25 (3) (b) of the Statute, anyone who orders, solicits, or induces someone who committed the acts of genocide, is also guilty of genocide.

Anyone can be tried for genocide, no matter what the person’s position. This means that not only those who pulled the trigger whether foot soldiers or next door neighbors can be guilty of the crime but also the head of state or government minister who planned or ordered the act. The ICC jurisdiction does not allow for immunity afforded to heads of state. Following illegal orders of superiors is not a defense to genocide.

b. Crimes against humanity were first codified in an international instrument in the Charter of the Nuremberg Trial in 1945 and were recognized as part of international law. They have now been clearly defined in an international treaty under the Rome Statute and is distinguished from ordinary crimes in 3 ways:

First, the acts constituting said crimes such as murder, must have been “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack”;

Second, they must be knowingly directed against a civilian population;

Third, they must have been committed pursuant to a “State or organizational policy”. Thus they can be committed by state agents or by persons acting at their instigation or with their acquiescence, such as vigilantes or para-military units. Crimes against humanity can also be committed pursuant to policies of organizations, such as rebel groups, which have no connection with the government.

The Rome Statute covers 11 types of acts, which may amount to crimes against humanity:

1. Murder;

2. Extermination which includes depriving people access to food or medicine, calculated to bring about their destruction;

3. Enslavement, or the exercise of power of ownership over a person, including trafficking of persons;

4. Forcible transfer of population, or deportation or forcing people to leave an area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law;

5. Imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of international law;

6. Torture, defined as intentionally causing severe physical or mental suffering to a person in custody or under the control of the accused;

7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;

8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law or in connection with any crime under the Statute;

9. Enforced disappearance-the arrest, detention or abduction of persons, by or with the authorization, consent or acquiescence of a state or a political organization, followed by either:

· a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom

· or a refusal to give information on the fate of the disappeared persons with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time;

10. Apartheid-inhumane acts committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over the other racial group committed with the intention of maintaining that regime; and

11.Other inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or mental or physical health.

These crimes can be committed either in time of peace or armed conflict. There is no requirement that crimes against humanity take place during armed conflict.

c. War crimes have been punishable by national courts since the Middle Ages. There have been numerous international humanitarian treaties developed in 1900s notably the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and its Regulations, the four Geneva Convention of 1949 and their 1977 Protocols.

Article 8 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over a wide range of war crimes committed during international armed conflicts which are recognized in these treaties and international customary law. It also reaffirmed recent developments in international law by giving the ICC the power to try war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts, such as civil wars, which are the most common conflicts today. Unlike crimes against humanity, a war crime can be single, isolated, dispersed or random act, without any requirement that it be widespread or systematic.

These war crimes can fall into two major categories.

First, the ICC can try person accused of grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 including the following willful acts when committed against protected persons such as wounded soldiers, shipwrecked sailors, prisoners of war, civilians in occupied territories:

· willful killing;

· torture or inhuman treatment including biological experiment;

· willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health;

· wanton destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity;

· compelling prisoners of war or other protected persons to serve in the forces of a hostile power;

· willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair trial;

· unlawful deportation and confinement;(and)

· taking of hostages.

Second, the Court has jurisdiction over serious violations of laws or customs applicable in international conflict within established framework of international law, including violations recognized in the Hague Regulations and Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and International customary law, including, among others:

· prohibited attacks on civilians such as civilian objects, humanitarian assistance or peace keeping missions;

· attacks when it is known that it will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage civilian objects or severe damage to the environment, which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;

· attacks on buildings, materials, medical units and transport personnel using Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems;

· against buildings, dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes; historic monuments and hospitals, provided they are not military objectives;

· harm to defenseless persons such as killing or wounding soldiers who have surrendered, physical ,mutilation or medical or scientific experiments which are neither medically justified or in the interest of the persons, and which seriously endangers their health;

· outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment;

· rape and other forms of sexual violence and the use of human shields;

· Prohibited methods of warfare, such as misuse of a flag of truce, UN or enemy insignia, emblems of the Red Cross or Red Crescent;

· Declaring that no quarters will be given, pillaging, seizing or destroying enemy property unless justified by military necessity;

· Use of prohibited weapons such as poison, certain gases, expanding bullets, and other weapons added to the Statute by amendment;

· Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare;

· Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them actively in hostilities; and

· Certain prohibited acts in occupied territory including the transfer by the occupier of parts of its own civilian population into the territory; or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory; or abolishing or suspending legal rights of enemy nationals.

Internal Conflict

In case of an armed conflict not of an international character, the Court has jurisdiction over serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions namely the following acts committed against persons “taking no active part in the hostilities”:

· violence to life and person (like) murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

· committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

· taking of hostages;

· passing sentence and carrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable.

It can also try other serious violations of humanitarian law recognized in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, including:

1. Intentionally directing attacks against civilian population as such, or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;

2. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units, and transport and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions (such as the Red Cross or the Red Crescent);

3. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel or vehicles, involved in humanitarian assistance and UN peacekeeping missions;

4. Intentionally directing attacks against a building dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;

5. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

6. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence;

7. Conscripting or enlisting children of under the age of 15 into the armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;

8. Ordering the displacement of civilian population for reasons related to the conflict not justified by their security or imperative military reasons;

9. Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;

10. Declaring that no quarters will be given;

11. Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person;(and)

12. Destroying or seizing the property of the adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict.

d. The Crime of Aggression What constitute the crime of aggression will still be discussed by signatories to the ICC. In international law, the concept of aggression has been slowly taking shape particularly in cases involving military actions involving the US, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El Salvador.

Some countries such as the United States, voted against the inclusion of the crime of Aggression in the Statute, fearful that it would expose military commanders who conduct military operations in other countries. The trial and punishment of violators of the crime of aggression can only be enforced once state signatories agree on its definition and elements.” (13)

Extent of the Court’s Jurisdiction

The ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. It has no retroactive effect. Crimes committed under the Marcos and Suharto regimes can no longer be punished under the Statute. In cases where the crime or complaint was referred by a State or initiated by the Prosecutor, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following states are Parties to the Statute or have accepted ICC’s jurisdiction:

a. The State on the territory which the alleged crime occurred;

b. The state of which the person accused of the crime is a national.

Those States which did not sign or ratify the Statute, although not under the court’s jurisdiction, may accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and cooperate in the implementation of the Statute. (14)

Obligations of State-Parties

State-parties under the Rome Statute have two basic obligations, namely: complementarity and full cooperation. States under the Statute have the primary responsibility of bringing parties or individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to justice. It is therefore the “duty of every state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” under the Statute. Being part of international law, such prohibited and punishable acts form part of the law of the land under the Philippine Constitution. Thus, they can be equally be prosecuted before the national courts. Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the court “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”. It means that the ICC will be able to act only when states with responsibility over an accused who is either resident or national, are unable or unwilling to prosecute the above mentioned crimes.

Under this principle States are expected to enact and then enforce national legislation which provides that crimes under international laws are also crimes under national law whenever they have been committed, no matter who committed them or who is the victim. It is therefore only when states are unable or unwilling to prosecute offenders will the Court be able to have jurisdiction over an accused.

State parties under Art. 86 agree to “cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” They should ensure that the ICC Prosecutor and the defense can conduct effective investigation in their jurisdiction, that their courts and other authorities provide full cooperation in obtaining documents, locating and seizing assets of the accused, conducting searches and seizures of evidence, locating and protecting witnesses and arresting and surrendering persons accused of crimes in the Court. The State shall also cooperate with the Court in enforcing sentences by making detention facilities available to convicted person. (15)

How Cases are Initiated before the Court

Taking into consideration the principles of complementarity, there are three (3) ways that an ICC investigation may be initiated:

“First, a State-Party may refer a ‘situation’ to the Prosecutor, where it appears that one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court was committed (Art.13.a and Art.14).

Second, the Security Council may refer a ‘situation’ to the Prosecutor (Art.13.b).

Third, the Prosecutor may initiate investigation moto propio or on her own, on the basis of information from any reliable source as to the commission of crimes (Art.13.c and Art.15). This is where individuals or NGO’s may file a ‘complaint’ with the Prosecutor who in turn may conduct an investigation.”

Under any of the above procedure, the Prosecutor may then apply for a warrant of arrest with the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber for the arrest and surrender of the suspect and if approved, a warrant of arrest shall be issued. The Court also recognizes and incorporates all the fundamental guarantees of the right to fair trial recognized in international law such as right against self-incrimination, right to counsel, against coercion and duress and double jeopardy. The imposition of death penalty is not sanctioned under the Rome Statute. (16)

International Criminal Court and U.S. National Security

As signatory to the treaty (Rome Statute), the U.S. is bound not to work against the purposes and objectives of the Treaty. This was noted by Secretary of State Powell in his confirmation testimony. Some of the critical point of concerns in U.S. policy-making on the International Criminal Court (ICC) are as follows:

I. The ICC is “significantly flawed” and the U.S. should seek a full exemption from the ICC jurisdiction.

It has been noted that the only outstanding “flaw” in the treaty cited during the Clinton Administration was the Court’s jurisdiction over individuals from countries that have not ratified the Treaty. The fact is that U.S. citizens and soldiers who commit crimes abroad are currently subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state in which the crime is committed. On the other hand, the ICC will have jurisdiction over the personnel of non-Party States only when these individuals commit crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC in the territory of a State Party, or in the territory of a state that has chosen to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. Until the U.S. ratifies the Treaty, the Court can only try Americans if they commit crimes in countries that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.

A non-partisan American Academy of Arts and Sciences report states that “(M)ost ICC signatories reportedly see little reason to create such an exemption, which appears designed to reward non-signatories and undermine the concept that all individuals are subject to the relevant international law. It appears highly unlikely that such a “fix” will be attained….”

This U.S. efforts for exemption are alienating their closest friends and allies, for whom the creation of a fair and effective ICC is a high foreign policy priority. In the Preparatory Commission (PreCom) meeting last November 2000, the German Delegation Head announced the German ratification of the treaty with a unanimous vote in the Bundestag. The German Government was warned and advised not to admit any changes of or exemptions from the Rome Statute. He further said that on the German side, they are confident that together with the members of the European Union, and all the 110 Signatory States, will not fail to fully safeguard the integrity of the Rome Statute.

Although the U.S. efforts at exemption will not succeed, it is imperative that a U.S. negotiator at the table will be present. There are important decisions to be made on financial regulations and rules, privileges and immunities, and other aspects relative to the court in the next PreCon sessions. Thus, it is in the interests of U.S. national security to continue positively engaged in the process of creating the Court.

II. Another concern is that U.S. military and civilian personnel and officials may be subject to frivolous or politically motivated charges by the Court. Considering that there are hundreds of thousands of soldiers deployed around the world, the U.S. would be the subject to be unjustly targeted.

A suggested option is that the ICC must defer to national courts under the principle of complementarity. It may not proceed with any case that is genuinely being already investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction, or has already been investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and that the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, or the person has already been tried for the same offense. Significantly, U.S. civilian and military negotiators subsequent to the conclusion of the Rome Treaty, worked hard to develop procedures that limit the likelihood of politicized prosecutions through greater precision in the definitions of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, among other protections. The efforts of the U.S delegations on substantive and technical issues has enormously strengthened the Rome Statute.

Another plus factor in the Statute is that any crime committed by an American would have to constitute a core crime under the ICC and would be subject to threshold for investigation and prosecution. All three crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, require some sort of plan, policy or strategy to commit the crimes, and the crimes must be committed as part of pattern of such crimes. Thus, the thresholds are so high that the U.S. and its official personnel could never, under U.S. law, plan and engage in such extraordinary severe, serious and systematic crimes. Besides, the Court will not acquire jurisdiction over individual crimes such as rapes, looting, or bar brawls, unless it could be shown that they were the result of an official U.S. policy. It is also submitted that atrocities committed by rogue units, like the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, would not fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.

On top of this, crimes falling under the Court’s jurisdictions has already been declared illegal for U.S. soldiers to commit under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the War Crimes Act (1996), according to Judge Robinson O. Everett of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. These laws have already created jurisdiction over war crimes on the part of U.S. courts-martial. Thus, under the principle of complementarity, the U.S. has basis for maintaining that U.S. service personnel accused of crimes prohibited by the Statute should be tried by the U.S. courts-martial and not by the ICC.

III. A third concern is the view that the ICC seems unconstitutional because it does not provide for a jury trial.

The U.S. Department of Justice have ruled that there are no constitutional barriers to joining the ICC. It is submitted that the ICC’s procedural protections constitute full U.S. Bill of Rights protections for accused persons, except for jury trials. But the right to jury trials in the Bill of Rights applies only to cases tried in the U.S. Active duty members of the armed forces are not guaranteed jury trials under the U.S. Constitution. Americans, it has been observed, have been extradited for trial abroad for hundreds of years, even to system without American-style justice system.

IV. The fourth concern is that the existence of the ICC might dampen U.S. military participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

There is no need for the U.S. to change its strategy because its strategy already conforms to international and domestic law in field operations. The Statute provides that the ICC must defer to agreements between states, such as U.S. Status of Forces Agreements, before proceeding with a request for surrender (Art. 98). The U.S. usually requires a SOFA or similar agreement before engaging in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. (17)

The Philippine Position and the Global War Against Terrorism

The Philippine government has not yet ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, for whatever reason it is still unknown to date. In a press statement by Representative Loretta Ann P. Rosales of Party-List AKBAYAN on May 8, 2002 before the Philippine Coalition on the International Criminal Court, she stated that:

“The reported “un-signing” by the United States of the Rome Statute is outrageously short-sighted and the height of arrogance and hypocrisy. Bush administration officials are saying that it was a mistake for the Clinton administration to have signed the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court and that the signature is no longer legally binding. Neither will they recognize the court’s jurisdiction, nor submit to any of its orders or cooperate with it. The Rome Statute is now in force and effect after having reached the required 60 ratifications last month. The International Criminal Court, which is being set up in The Hague in the Netherlands, will have jurisdiction over crimes committed after July 1 of this year (2002) and will begin operations next year (2003). The U.S. has even gone further to say that it will not be bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 1969 multilateral treaty which establishes the rules on the observance of international agreements between states to which the U.S. is also a party. Under it, states are obliged to refrain from taking steps to undermine treaties they sign, even if they do not ratify them.

“The U.S. renunciation of the Rome State is ominous, in the light of the so-called global war against terrorism’ which the U.S. leads and which has extended to our shores with the Balikatan war exercises. The U.S. is waging this global war ostensibly in the name of high moral values and internationally accepted norms of conduct and behavior in the wake of the 11th September 2001 terror attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., and yet it refuses to be bound by the same standards. Reports from the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden reveal that atrocities have been committed by U.S. troops there. The possibility of it happening here in the jungles of Basilan, the mountains of Central Mindanao and the plains of Central Luzon is not remote.

“This also shows an alarming trend towards unilateralism on the part of the U.S. It seems so easy for it to reject its obligations under multilateral treaties when it does not suit its purpose. Recently, it rejected the Kyoto Protocol and its obligations under the International Convention on Climate Change. In the past, it rejected the ruling of the International Court of Justice that held it liable for mining the harbors of Nicaragua during the Reagan-sponsored Contra war against the Sandinista regime then.

“We hope that the Philippine government would show better sense and largeness of mind than Uncle Sam in this regard, although its inaction on the matter of ratification of the Rome Stature has been pathetic so far. It has been one-and-a half years since former President Joseph Estrada signed the Rome Stature on 28th of December 2000, but the executive department has so far failed to formally endorse the treaty to the Senate for ratification. We hope that government inaction is not a case of a ‘follow-the-leader mentality on the part of the Philippines.” (18)

Dr. Aurora A Parong, Executive Director of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), concurrent Deputy Chairperson of the Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court (PC-ICC), similarly issued a statement on May 8, 2002, expressing disappointment in the U.S. rejection of the International Criminal Court and calls it as a step backward for international criminal justice. A portion of her statement is quoted as follow:” (19)

“We find no justification to the recent unsigning of the US agreement of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. This is a rejection of the world tribunal which can help deliver justice to victims of heinous crimes such those of the dictator Marcos, when government and domestic judicial system is unable and unwilling to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. This is a regressive action for international criminal justice.

We have reasons to be concerned about the US move. The unsigning has several problematic implications to the Philippines.

· President Arroyo might do a Bush. President Arroyo might follow the action of President Bush of ‘unsigning’. If President Arroyo, who has supported US policy in the past, unsigns or not endorse the Rome Statute for ratification, the citizens of the Philippines will be deprived of another venue to seek justice for grave crimes.

In the US, the Rome Statute for the international court was signed by the previous president, President Clinton. Similar to the US, the Rome Statute was signed by a previous president, President Estrada. The Philippine signature was done in December 28, 2000. It is 17 months since the signature and yet, the President (in behalf of the Executive branch of government) has not endorsed the world court’s documents to the Senate for ratification. Thus, despite the fact that Senator Loren Legarda Leviste has filed a resolution for ratification, this cannot be acted upon due to the absence of the documents.

· In case there is commission by any American soldier or official of any of the crimes covered by the court and they are not prosecuted domestically or by the US, then there is no other venue for redress of the victims and their families. This has serious implications considering that there are many American soldiers and officials outside the US. In the Philippines, there are about thousands coming in and out related to the Balikatan exercises.

· In case of a crime of aggression-where another country attacks the Philippines-our country will have no venue for redress. So far, this is the only court which will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. For a country like the Philippines, which has been a victim of aggressive attacks and colonization by other countries and where hundreds of thousands of our people were killed because of such, the International Criminal Court is a hope for justice for the future. If we recall about 200,000 were killed among our people during the Fil-American war.

The failure of governments to prosecute dictators and perpetrators of heinous crimes doubly victimize our already impoverished bodies and souls. We view the International Criminal Court as one hope for justice when we cannot have justice in our country. We are keeping our finger crossed that President Arroyo will not do a Bush unsigning.’”

As finally pointed out by Representative Rosales, “(I)t is not yet too late for the Philippine government to get on board the process of setting up the ICC. It should expedite the process of ratification before the first meeting of the Assembly of State Parties takes place in a couple of months. The Arroyo administration should demonstrate to the country and the world that her government is on the side of victims of human rights violations and not that of transgressors, dictators and war criminals, and that it is on the side of justice and not of impunity. It should also show that, unlike the U.S., understands and upholds the time-honored principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda-agreements should be honored and observed. Simply put in Pilipino: “Kapag pinirmahan mo, pangatawanan mo!” (20)

State and Non-State Actors in Low Intensity Conflicts

Internal armed conflicts or wars of low intensity such as civil wars and liberation movements are most common conflicts today. In the absence of a comprehensive international treaty on terrorism, there is no precise legal definition of the term “terrorism”. And such definition must include a clear distinction between, criminal acts of terrorism and acts of resistance against foreign occupation and/or of national liberation. That a comprehensive definition shall likewise include acts by states, groups and individuals on the international as well as on the national level. The comprehensive approach must also be compatible with and even complementary to the UN General Assembly’s concern of the principle of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter and the “inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples… under foreign occupation resulting therefrom, with the consequence of “upholding the legitimacy of … the struggle of national liberation movements’” (resolution 46/51 of December 1991). In conformity with the General Assembly resolutions, acts of national resistance shall not be criminalized per se, but shall be judged according to the same rules as acts of regular warfare by a national army. Thus, both state and non-state actors shall be held by the same standards of international humanitarian law. (21)

Under the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity is distinguished from ordinary crimes in three ways: ”First, the acts constituting said crimes such as murder, must have been ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;’ “Second, they must be knowingly directed against a civilian population; and third, they must have been committed pursuant to a “State or organizational policy”. In case of a State, they can be committed by state agents or by persons acting at their instigation or with their acquiescence, such as vigilantes or para-military units. It can also be committed pursuant to policies of organization, such as rebel groups, which have no connection with the government. The Rome State covers eleven types of acts amounting to crimes against humanity.

Article 8 of the Rome Statute has incorporated the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and its Regulations, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 Protocols. The ICC has jurisdiction over a wide range of war crimes committed during international armed conflicts, including the power to try war crimes committed in an internal armed conflicts. Unlike crimes against humanity, a war crime can be single, isolated, dispersed or random act, without any requirement that it be widespread or systematic.

Paragraph 2(c), Art. 8 of the Rome Statute covers serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions in case of armed conflict not of an international character committed against persons, taking no active part in the hostilities”, namely:

1. violence to life and person, such as murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

2. committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

3. taking of hostages;

4. passing sentence and carrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable.

The ICC has also the power to try other serious violations of humanitarian law recognized in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which constitute serious violations of the laws and custom applicable in armed conflict not of an international character. Paragraph 2(e) of Art. 8 of the Rome Statute enumerates twelve (12) prohibited acts. Paragraph 2(c) of Art. 8 does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such ad riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. (22)

Liberation Movements and Islamic Militancy in the Asean Region

The ASEAN Region is an Islamic Archipelago stretching from southern Thailand down to the Malay peninsula towards the Indonesian Archipelago to the Moluccas Islands and upward towards Borneo, Mindanao and Sulu islands, including southern Palawan in Southern Philippines. (23) The region is a hosts to the so-called “moderate” or “Political Islam” which has lived in co-existence with their secular regimes. The rise of Islamic militancy is not new to the region. During the regime of Sukarno in Indonesia, a radical Islamic movement known as “Darul-Islam” emerged to contest the Sukarno secular role. This was short-lived after its leaders were either neutralized or went underground. What was significant is that from the early fifties and onward was the birth of various Islamic movements and organizations all aimed for Islamic revival and unity among its Muslim peoples. They were the “moderate” form of Islam that sought reforms within the existing political systems. Among them were the Nadhatul Ulama of Indonesia and the Philippine Muslim Association in the Philippines.

The scenario changed in the late sixties on account of the upheavals in the Middle East particularly the war of national liberation by the People of Palestine, the Vietnam War and the civil war in Afghanistan. Local national Islamic movements started to have overly of Islamic “irredentism”. While the former was originally aimed at national reform, the latter is aimed at changing the “World Order” as protest against western imperial dominance and corruption by leaders under existing Muslim regimes.

In the Philippines, the infamous “Jabbidah Massacre” became the pivotal point in the rise of Muslim militancy. (24) On May 1, 1968, the late Governor Datu Udtog Matalam issued the historic Manifesto calling for the organization of the Republic of Mindanao and Sulu.(25) During the declaration of Martial Law by former dictator Marcos the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) became the dominant force seeking for an independent Bangsa Moro Homeland. After Nur Misuari, Chairman of the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement with the Philippine government on December 23, 1976, the late Professor Salamat Hashim due to some differences with the former broke away from the MNLF and continued to pursue the Moro cause for an independent Bangsa Moro state. On September 2, 1996, the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement with the Philippine government.(26) The full implementation of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996 is still a hanging issue in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Meantime the Arroyo government has an on-going peace negotiation with the MILF.

The September 11, 2001 attack on the New York Trade Center has transformed the ASEAN region as the second front for the US led war against terrorism. The issue of terrorism has now become a high priority agenda among ASEAN countries. To date, however, there is still no clear agreement among the ASEAN member states on the precise definition of terrorism. Ten ASEAN members during a two-day meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2001 have agreed to disagree on what constitute terrorism. Instead, they focused on forming a united anti-terror front and pledged to set up a strong regional security framework agreement.(27)

The campaign against terrorism in the ASEAN region is hampered by the lack of a precise definition of what constitute “terrorism” as a transnational crime. The Philippines and the rest of the ASEAN countries are still in the stage of drafting anti-terror laws. In the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995, “Terrorism” is defined as “the use of violence, threat or intimidation or destructive of lives or properties with the objective of creating fear in the public mind to achieve a purported political end and to coerce or influence their behavior to undermine the confidence of the general public on the government.”

In the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures signed in May 2002 between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, terrorism is defined as “any act of violence or threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the respective territories of the parties or in the border area of any of the Parties by an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedom, security or rights or exposing the environment of any facility or public private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them or endangering a natural resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of Independent States.” (28)

The above definitions suffer serious flaws. It run counter to the Geneva Declaration on Terrorism of 1987 “which undertook an effort towards a comprehensive definition including acts by states, groups and individuals on the international as well as on the national level.” (29) The definition has also



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