

**Hans Köchler**  
**Democracy and the New World Order**  
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**1. The New World Order and the Global Claim to Power after the End of the East-West Conflict**

On January 16, 1991 at the beginning of the Gulf War, the American President proclaimed a “new world order” characterized by the rule of law: “where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.”<sup>1</sup> After the end of the war, which was a military success for the United States, George Bush attempted to define his vague formulations and invoked the post-war pathos of Sir Winston Churchill by calling justice, fair play, freedom, and the observation of human rights the basis of a new order among the peoples, which was to “protect the weak against the strong.”<sup>2</sup> A political theorist has to investigate to what extent these and similar declarations by political leaders of the West since the collapse of communism entail more than an attempt to ideologically legitimate the exercise of power and the applications of military force, indeed to what extent George Bush’s eschatological excess about the period he ruled—“This was the first time when humankind came to its own ...”<sup>3</sup> – can be justified in terms of a fundamental historical change: the paradigm change of a political world-view.

Every epoch has a propensity to eschatologically transfigure its own achievements. The spirit of the times readily invokes the “world historical spirit” when the protection of power interests actually is at stake. Hegel—just as Heidegger later—demonstrated this with his embarrassing spirit-of-the-times’ opportunism, which was justified by the conception of an irrational idealistic philosophy of history and which found its continuation in the various forms of totalitarianism in our century. Francis Fukuyama, a protagonist of the American way of life who is overrated as a philosopher of culture, succumbed to the temptation of

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<sup>1</sup> *Address to the Nation*, January 16, 1991.

<sup>2</sup> *Address to Congress*, March 6, 1991. Official text, United States Information Service: “Bush Cites Need for Regional Security in Middle East” (Text: Bush 3/6 address to Congress), p. 5. In this respect the American President evidently understood his concept of a New World Order as “the contemporary answer to an ideal form of world society.” Camilo Dagum formulated this long before the contemporary debate began in “Elements for a New World Order,” in *International Social Science Review*, vol. 52 (1982), p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> *Address to the U.N. General Assembly*, October 1, 1990.

prematurely transfiguring and immunizing the achievements of his own system by declaring that the collapse of communism was virtually the end of “history as such.”<sup>4</sup> In light of the fact that in the course of this development the “liberal democracy” of the West proved to be the more successful system, Fukuyama argues that it “may constitute the ‘end of point of mankind’s ideological evolution.’”<sup>5</sup> The factual success of this model of political organization in terms of power politics allows apologists like Fukuyama to almost completely dispense with a critical analysis of the concept of democracy and to speak of a “remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government,”<sup>6</sup> even if a completely different system of values is propagated in a great number of states. Statements to the effect that this system is “arguably free from fundamental inner contradictions”<sup>7</sup> effectively pre-empt an intellectually unprejudiced encounter with the basic structures of this model of democracy. These interpretations are further reinforced by the fallacious conclusion of power politics that the failure of the opposing model already has proven the correctness—i.e. the democratic adequacy—of one’s own system.

Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, apotheosis appears in the place of self-criticism. This attitude is embodied in talk about a new world order, which is formulated along the basic lines of “liberal” democracy. All further questions about the specific kind of democracy and about its realization in the model practiced by the West are repressed because this model—which has been postulated as exemplary since the end of the Cold War—exactly represents the basis of the Western world’s universal claim to hegemony and the United States’ position as its leading power.<sup>8</sup> The concomitant political eschatology even allows a revival of the presumably defunct doctrine of “just war” in the service of democracy and peace.<sup>9</sup> The extreme, uncritical Eurocentrism of the colonial era is revived with all of its political presumption and arbitrariness when, for example, a representative of so-called “critical” rationalism, Sir Karl Popper, speaks about the “states of the civilized world” and implicitly assumes that they can responsibly handle weapons of mass destruction and have the

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<sup>4</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” in *The National Interest*, vol. 16 (Summer 1989), p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, 1992, p. ix.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> The source of the fear of many Third World countries is “...that the New World Order might be a concept rationalizing hegemony” (according to Michel Doo Kingue in a report on a seminar of UNITAR: *The Role of the United Nations in the New World Order*. UNITAR, 1991, p. 5.).

<sup>9</sup> See “‘Kriege führen für den Frieden.’ Der Philosoph Karl R. Popper über den Kollaps des Kommunismus und die neuen Aufgaben der Demokratie,” *Spiegel-Gespräch*, in *Der Spiegel*, n. 13 (1992), pp. 202-211. Note the cynicism—which usually is characteristic of realpolitik but is surprising for a philosopher—in his evaluation of the world situation: “We may not be afraid of going to war for peace. Under the current circumstances it is unavoidable” (p. 207).

right to discipline “immature” countries of the Third World.<sup>10</sup> The sublimated racism, which allows thinkers like Popper to compare the Third World with a “kindergarten,”<sup>11</sup> corresponds to many editorial commentaries which frequently justified the brutal military interventions of the West.

Upon closer investigation, the ideals, which were repeatedly invoked in political declarations, prove to be a component part of a legitimation strategy that promotes a *policy of double standards* for the sake of its own power interests, i.e. is supposed to make it globally acceptable.<sup>12</sup> Under such circumstances, the exercise of power, indeed the use of violence can be—completely in the sense of the traditional international law one believed to have overcome—respectively morally qualified. If they serve a “higher goal”—“securing peace” and democracy, for example, whatever this is supposed to mean—then they are legitimate. Within the framework of a New World Order, it even appears possible to circumvent the ban on the use of force anchored in the UN Charter, if the respective power succeeds in having its interests sanctioned under the auspices of the UN Security Council. As a result, wars of aggression (as coalition wars) are cynically declared to be measures for the defense of international law.<sup>13</sup>

It is the task of a philosopher to critically question claims of legitimacy and not to simply adopt official explanations untested. Therefore, it will be necessary to take a closer look at the terminology of the discourse about the New World Order and to define the central concept of democracy more precisely than is done so in exercises of political rhetoric. The healthy suspicion of political philosophy for the ideological claims of political discourse in general, and for the proclamation of a new world order in particular, is fed by the statement of George Bush cited at the beginning of this paper and confirmed by his triumphantly formulated State of the Union address of January 29, 1992, in which he proclaimed the United States’ victory in the Cold War and –after having praised the protection of the weak by the strong a year earlier—formulated a type of superpower ideology for the New World Order. In this context, he left the determination of the moral criteria for the exercise of power up to his own discretion: “Much good can come from the prudent use of power.”<sup>14</sup> It is noteworthy

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<sup>10</sup> Op. cit., p. 208.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> In this context, James Mayall ascertains that the “rhetoric” of the New World Order—especially with reference to its human rights claim—lacks all substance. See his “Non-intervention, self-determination, and the ‘new world order,’” in *International Affairs*, vol. 67 (1991), p. 421.

<sup>13</sup> On the general aspects of power politics in the present constitutional framework of the United Nations see *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council. Examining a Normative Contradiction in the UN Charter and its Consequences on International Relations*, here, pp. 85ff.

<sup>14</sup> *State of the Union Message*, January 29, 1992. U.S. Information Service, p. 3.

how rapidly the classical terminology of power politics replaced the idealistic formulations of the “transitional period” of 1989-1991, i.e. after the position of the United States became clear and had consolidated itself. The traditional hegemonial instruments were already employed at the beginning of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, although they were garnished with idealistic phrases. From this point on, the President openly justified the political-military instrumentalization of the United Nations for the policy interests of the U.S.A. in terms of power politics: “For the world trusts us with power....”<sup>15</sup> Therefore, theorists of international relations are justified in raising the question as to what extent the talk about a new world order—with all the concomitant declarations about democracy, the rule of law, etc.—is not just a euphemistic description for a *pax Americana* after the end of the Cold War.<sup>16</sup>

The principal question, which all the ceremonious declarations and proclamations about a just new order cannot hide, is to what extent a fundamentally *new* system can be realized with the structures of the old system. In other words, if one maintains the paradigm of power politics, can one credibly claim to erect a new order also characterized by the application of democracy in inter-state relations? Does the replacement of a bipolar system with a unipolar one not entail a renaissance of traditional power politics because the checks and balances, which are conditions for democracy and the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*), naturally can only be realized in a multipolar system?<sup>17</sup> Has the renaissance of the Security Council as an actor in the international scene—after decades of paralysis in a bipolar system of mutual distrust and alternating obstruction based on veto privilege—not been purchased at the expense of uniformity of the global power constellation even greater than the one we experienced in the decades of the Cold War? Is the “activation” of the UN not more the result of a paralysis of all competition in the realm of power politics? How can one talk about a new order if the central paradigm of the old order now expresses itself much more clearly and pregnantly? How can democracy be propagated using the means of principles—such as democratic decision-making—are invalidated exactly under those circumstances in which they can have immediate consequences for the fate of humanity: specifically in the realm of the United Nations?<sup>18</sup> Why have demands for a democratization of international relations not been extended to the organization of the United Nations? These are the questions which have to be asked after the end of the East-West conflict if one wants to take seriously the

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> See S. Nanjundan, “A New World Order?” in *Economic and Political Weekly*. June 1-8, 1991, p. 1389.

<sup>17</sup> For example, Paul M. Sweezy speaks of a “new world disorder” that has replaced the earlier world order, which he characterized as an “uneasy equilibrium” between superpowers. See “What’s New in the New World Order?” in *Monthly Review*, vol. 43, n. 2 (June 1991), pp. 1f.

<sup>18</sup> See *The United Nations and the New World Order. Keynote address from the Second International Conference On a More Democratic United Nations*. Ed. Hans Köchler, Vienna, 1992.

*ideological claim* that manifests itself in the declarations about the New World Order. A critical evaluation of realpolitik is absolutely necessary to address these issues, and it has to be based on a philosophical critique of the prevailing conceptions of democracy, if one is to avoid the dangers of a merely symptomatic description.

## **2. Ideological Claims versus Real Political Action: The Quest for a New Paradigm in International Relations**

The political texts on the New World Order to date consist to a great extent in empty phrases—insofar as they are not of a confidential nature. Slogans about democracy, collective security, the promotion of free world trade, etc.,<sup>19</sup> merely evoke vague objectives and ideals which all states pretend to support. Furthermore, the ambition behind the phrase of a New World Order is not new. It was expressed in previous slogans about “A World Safe for Democracy,” “Free World,” “One World,” etc.,<sup>20</sup> and was—in the sense of a leading moral role of the U.S.A.—especially articulated by President Carter, who strikingly often sought refuge in the use of idealistic terminology.<sup>21</sup> The post-war rhetoric, which accompanied the foundation of the United Nations, is also in this vein. However, how the superpower U.S.A. actually sees the dimensions of this New World Order is less evident in those ceremonious declarations intended for a broad public than in documents not intended for publication, such as the confidential strategy paper of the Pentagon which formulates the central concept for the order after the Cold War as a “benevolent domination by one power.” Within this context, the decisive task of U.S. defense policy should be the maintenance of the military power necessary “to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging U.S. primacy.”<sup>22</sup> (The “correction” which the State Department subsequently published after heavy international criticism falls most likely into the category of public relations.)

If the adjective “new” is to have any justification whatsoever, then the world order after the end of the East-West rivalry must have at least one fundamental structural

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<sup>19</sup> See, for example, the list in Morton Kondracke’s “Behind the ‘New World Order’. The Fine Print,” in *The New Republic*. February 25, 1991, p. 13.

<sup>20</sup> See James Kurth, “Things to Come. The Shape of the New World Order,” in *The National Interest* (Summer 1991), pp. 3-12.

<sup>21</sup> See O. Edmund Clubb, “Morality, Law, and the New World Order,” in *Worldview*. September 1977, pp. 39-42.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted in the *International Herald Tribune*, 11/92, March 9, 1992. In a masterful critique of ideology, Darnovsky, Kauffman, and Robinson pointed out this officially not admitted strategy beforehand: “Behind the talk of a new world order is a contest to determine the balance of power in the post-Cold War world—a contest among the supposed victors of the Cold War.” See “Warring Stories. Reading and Contesting the New World Order,” in *Socialist Review*, vol. 21 (1991), pp. 13f.

characteristic which distinguishes it from the previous bipolar order. A purely formal differentiation—along the lines of bipolarity, unipolarity, multipolarity, for example—would remain on the surface of the phenomenon of the exercise of power. However, the specific difference to the previous system could lie in the applications of democracy to international relations, which to date have been predominantly characterized by the politics of power and interests. The Charter of the United Nations with the privileged position of the permanent members of the Security Council clearly documents this fact.<sup>23</sup> If the propagation of democracy as the fundamental element of the New World Order is to have a meaning, then one may not remain on the level of domestic politics; in the formulation of international game rules, one has to submit one's own state to the same principles as all others—and, above all, accept that the same principles that are valid on a domestic level also apply internationally.<sup>24</sup> Under these circumstances, an unreflected politics of interests could not be propagated as a contribution towards the erection of a new world order, and democracy would become a structural principle of transnational organization—and not a slogan for legitimating one's own global claim to power.

As a matter of fact, the formulations cited above document that the U.S.A.—and with it the Western world—wants to renew and more effectively secure a claim of hegemony, which always has been propagated, with the slogan of a new, more just order. This is documented by the fact that those leaders who invoke an (Western) ideology of freedom and pretend to erect a new international architecture, seek to achieve these objectives using the means of old power politics. The renaissance of the United Nations as an instrument of “collective security” (which actually is the security of the U.S.A. and its allies) makes this perfectly clear. As we show elsewhere in greater detail,<sup>25</sup> the Charter of the United Nations reflects the power constellation of 1945, and the privileged position of the five permanent members of the Security Council is an expression thereof. The principle of the sovereign (legal) equality of states, which is anchored in the Charter, is, as a result, annulled *de facto* because the decisive competence for the enforcement of international law is reserved for exactly that body in which five members possess a veto privilege. In the course of the “Gulf Crisis,” the world saw the consequences of this constellation in terms of realpolitik. The United Nations provided a framework of legitimation for a military action led by the U.S.A.

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<sup>23</sup> See *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council*, here, pp. 85ff.

<sup>24</sup> In this context, Yoshikazu Sakamoto speaks of the necessity of establishing democracy as a universal political norm: “...democracy, unless globalized, cannot work as the political framework in which the people actually participate in solving [the] problems” of peace, development, the environment, etc. See “Introduction: The Global Context of Democratization,” in *Alternatives*, vol. 16 (1991), p. 122.

<sup>25</sup> See *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council*, pp. 89 f.

In light of the circumstances of power politics, the Security Council has become an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in the meantime.<sup>26</sup> As a result, the policy of double standards almost necessarily became the official policy of the United Nations because the Security Council, based on the structural deficiency of the veto in the Charter, can only act when U.S. interests allow it. Furthermore, the dimensions of the respective actions—ranging, for example, from the enforcement of sanctions to the use of military force—are determined by American interests. The fundamental dilemma has been strikingly formulated in the commentary of American political scientists: “No country is fit to take on the role of arbiter of international law and order on the pretense that she does not have vested interests of her own.”<sup>27</sup>

Therefore, if one actually propagates democracy as the new paradigm for international order—in distinction to the power-political maxims of classical international law<sup>28</sup>—then such an idealistic program has to be followed by action. In particular, those provision in the UN Charter that secure the privileged position of the post-war powers must be eliminated because they express nothing more than a power-political immunization which *legally* allows the respectively strongest power to turn the other states into hostages of its veto right and to initiate aggression itself without fear of instigating legal sanctions. Once a decision has been made upon the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, then specific enforcement measures can be upheld practically arbitrarily because the member equipped with the veto right can autonomously determine when the member country being disciplined has completely fulfilled the respective “conditions.” Here the door to an arbitrary and arrogant use of power is thrown wide open. The price has to be paid by whole peoples, who slip between the grindstones of global political conflicts of interests, which are respectively carried out by ruling elites, and not among the peoples themselves.

As long as the Charter of the United Nations has not been cleansed of the relics of power politics and effectively is used to perpetuate a power constellation that was the result of a war, talk about the *new* foundations upon which international relations are to be founded is nothing more than empty pathos. Real political action reduces the ideological claim *ad absurdum*. “Democracy” is then solely a slogan for securing international hegemony. The actual conditions for the application of democracy in inter-state relations are consciously abstracted. Despite all rhetoric, the discourse about the New World Order does not address the taboo of power politics; how could one otherwise understand the ideological functions of

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<sup>26</sup> See Richard Falk, “Reflections on Democracy and the Gulf War,” in *Alternatives*, vol. 16 (1991), pp. 263-274. He deals here with this whole complex of problems.

<sup>27</sup> “Towards a New World Order?” (initialled C.C., D.M.), in *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 62 (1991), p. 148.

<sup>28</sup> See *The Principles of International Law and Human Rights*, here, pp. 63 ff.

interest politics which consist of stylizing respective hegemonic interests into (universal) human interests? As James Petras has aptly observed, the current efforts of the U.S.A., which understands itself as the only superpower, are aimed at the establishment of a new global order focused on military power.<sup>29</sup> This excludes every form of *multipolarity* and is, as a result, in contradiction to the most fundamental democratic principles. Within the system of political representation in a state, democracy only can be realized within a *multi-party system* (multipolar), not in the form of the hegemony of one party; analogously, democracy is impossible on a transnational level in a *monopolar* system. It sounds exceptionally unusual when representatives of the only superpower, which can arbitrarily annul the new game rules, speak about “international justice,” “partnership,” etc. The discrepancy between economic and social multipolarity and military and/or political monopolarity painfully promotes an awareness of the absence of an authentically new orientation in international relations.

After the end of bipolarity, which indeed paralyzed international politics for decades but also prevented the escalation of conflicts into global confrontations, the chance for a “generous” new design would present itself for the first time. Unfortunately the opportunity the collapse of the old order presented was only used for a new “global political rhetoric,” not for a restructuring of inter-state relations according to the principles of *multipolarity*, i.e. democracy, which consists in the recognition of the freedom and (normative) equality of all people—as individuals and as members of nations (collectives). Democracy only has an emancipatory meaning (in the sense of the realization of fundamental human rights) when it is seen in its international dimension, when the citizen is treated as a world citizen (cosmopolitan)—with all of the consequential rights and duties. Emancipation within a state is self-deception in the final analysis if citizens are still subjected to the international constellation of power and, for example, if the citizens of a specific state possess far fewer possibilities to articulate, i.e. to realize, themselves than the citizens of “privileged” states. In this context, the demand from the seventies for a new international economic order,<sup>30</sup> which was promptly dismissed exactly by those bodies which count in power politics, could only be realized if the citizens of the then under-privileged countries would be democratically represented in the international bodies that execute power politics. This would entail not only an elimination of the veto in the Security Council, but also a redistribution of the votes<sup>31</sup> of

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<sup>29</sup> See his “Gulf War and the New World Order,” in *Economic and Political Weekly*. March 2-9, 1991, p. 482.

<sup>30</sup> See *The New International Economic Order. Philosophical and Socio-cultural Implications*. Ed. Hans Köchler, Guildford, 1980.

<sup>31</sup> For the general problem of the weighting of votes in the United Nations see H. Newcombe, J. Wert, and A. Newcombe, *Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations*. Preprint, Peace Research Institute, Dundas/Ont., 1970.



the individual states in proportion to the size of their populations. It would be viewed as a violation of the principles of democracy within a state if the votes of individual citizens would be weighted, for example, according to their material status (property). Correspondingly, every form of preferential treatment based upon the criteria of traditional power politics must be eliminated in international bodies. The only admissible criterion for the weighting of votes is population size. Only this procedure corresponds to the democratic principles of the freedom and equality of all citizens regardless of their race, national origin and citizenship, etc.<sup>32</sup>

The realization of international democracy in this emancipatory sense was unfortunately not approached in the current situation. Interests are not deferred upon the basis of moral considerations but are rather retracted only as the result of the effective use of power. Therefore, the opportunity for a radical reorientation in a situation, in which one state understood itself as the unquestioned victor of a global power struggle, practically had to be missed. Furthermore, one of the results of the course of events was that the outcome of the power struggle prohibited a *critical analysis of the victor's own interests*, which subsequently—in terms of the interpretation of the “only superpower”—were attributed to be universally *legitimate and binding*.

Under the cloak of “erecting a new world order”—opportunity creates thieves—the U.S.A. actually used the chance, which the global community of nations missed, to create a monopolar system of order secured primarily by military force.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, in its management of the Gulf Crisis, the U.S.A. factually had its power monopoly recognized by the other members of the Security Council, and it used this *fait accompli* in the spirit of the traditional doctrine of international law based on power politics for a reinterpretation of the UN Charter in the realm of the clauses dealing with the use of military force in Chapter VII in a manner which effectively undermined the Charter itself.<sup>34</sup> Through the factual annulment of the operative clauses of Chapter VII<sup>35</sup>--a process in which Austria also more or less enthusiastically participated—the U.S.A. also succeeded in having its claim to world

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<sup>32</sup> See the conception of the author in *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council*, here, pp. 112 f., note 74.

<sup>33</sup> See Richard Falk, *Reflections on Democracy and the Gulf War*, p. 273: “...a master project that has proclaimed geopolitical destiny under the banner of a new world order.”

<sup>34</sup> Theo Sommer pointed out in a brilliant analysis that this reduced the conception of collective security anchored in the UN Charter *ad absurdum*: “There will be no world of collective security in which the last superpower respectively organizes a coalition of paying allies, who then punish the evildoers.” “Neue Welt, neue Unordnung. Eine Bilanz der internationalen Politik ein Jahr nach der Befreiung Kuwaitss,” in *Die Zeit*, n. 11, March 6, 1992, p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> See the memoranda of the author in his capacity as the President of International Progress Organization (I.P.O.) to the Security Council of the United Nations dated September 28, 1990 and December 19, 1990.

hegemony as a *power of global order* (global policeman) legally sanctioned. This disastrous process of undermining the UN Charter,<sup>36</sup> which has been accurately described by Erskine Childers,<sup>37</sup> has continued in the recent sanctions against Libya which the U.S.A. has brought through the Security Council.<sup>38</sup> The great majority of the member states—including Austria—appear to be transfixed like the rabbit in front of the snake when a country acts by referring to its military-political status as a superpower.

It is self-evident that “democracy” and the “rule of law” become instruments of cynical realpolitik when used under such circumstances. They degenerate to mere ideological phrases, as Noam Chomsky has described so well.<sup>39</sup> They are part of a hegemonic discourse which—according to the interests of the dominant power—defines not only their concrete content, but also above all the *realm of application*. In the sense of a “democratic make-believe,”<sup>40</sup> they are employed as a sort of “value-phrase” with which particular political systems are to be supported or discredited. Democracy (*domestic*) is identified respectively with a regime that is useful in terms of power politics (see the ideological contortions of the allied coalition in the course of the Gulf War!). Democracy (*domestic*) is then demanded if a regime conducts itself insubordinately and if a violation of its sovereignty (using political, economic, or military pressure) needs to be justified. Democracy (*transnational*) is then applied, if no other “higher” (national) interests are at stake. Otherwise the rules of partnership, non-interference, and the renunciation of the use of force do not apply, but rather—recently—the principles of “humanitarian intervention.” However, no complaints are ever lodged if human rights are violated by an ally. In the New World Order, humanitarian intervention degenerates to a means of discipline on the realm of power politics because the previously existing control mechanisms based on the rivalry of the superpowers no longer are in force. The moral integrity to decide—without external controls and constraints—in a manner which places one’s own interests aside can be assumed even less of state leadership than of individuals. Instead of *idealism*, which orients itself on the *volonté générale* of

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<sup>36</sup> It is difficult to comprehend to what extent the credibility of the United Nations as an instrument for the enforcement of international law should have been strengthened by the measures taken in the course of the Gulf War as Russett and Sutterlin imply in “The U.N. in a New World Order,” in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70 (1991), pf. 82. Only within the framework of the traditional paradigm of power politics, as advocated by the *realist* theory of international relations, can one greet a development in which the United Nations was prepared “to change the parameters of the global order to something more favourable than existed under the prior status quo.” The question remains as to who should benefit from this new order.

<sup>37</sup> See his “Empowering ‘We the Peoples’ in the United Nations,” in *The United Nations and the New World Order*. Ed. Hans Köchler, pp. 23-36.

<sup>38</sup> See *Declaration of Legal Experts on U.N. Sanctions Against Libya*. Geneva, May 23, 1992 published by the International Progress Organization.

<sup>39</sup> See his chapter “Force and Opinion,” in *Deterring Democracy*. London/New York, 1991, pp. 351ff.

<sup>40</sup> Christian Bay, “Access to Political Knowledge as a Human Right,” in *Human Context*, vol. 7 (1975), p. 388.

humanity understood as the community of free citizens, *realism* triumphs, for which there is no (international) solidarity but exclusively (national) interests which need no legitimation. Democracy is found where it is convenient; the rule of law is enforced if it corresponds to interests. Legitimate interests are therefore exclusively those of the *power center* (of the respective superpower) which also claims for itself a kind of *monopoly on definitions* in terms of the central concepts of the ruling ideology. In this context, Noam Chomsky, with a critical reference to the theses of Walter Lippmann, has accurately described the fundamental mechanisms of the formation and creation of opinions.<sup>41</sup>

### 3. The Theory of Democracy as a Component of a Strategy of Legitimation

Ideological legitimation is one of the characteristic features in all of the discussion surrounding a new world order which we have attempted to describe above. This attribute is related to the previously mentioned monopoly on definitions and can be described in two respects: on the one hand, it provides additional legitimacy for the respective order within a state (social system) by emphasizing the exemplary character of this model of democracy (the “liberal” system), etc.; on the other hand, the Machiavellian conduct of the state in terms of its external affairs—power and policy interests which contradict the principles of democracy—is to be justified as a means to the end of realizing or implementing this morally “superior” system which allegedly corresponds better to human rights. The “correct” definition of “democracy” and the manipulation of public opinion in the direction of an oligarchical understanding of democracy are decisive for this legitimation strategy. As the author has described at greater length elsewhere,<sup>42</sup> the democratic model which the West propagates for global application is the exercise of power by representatives selected by the people, i.e. the rule of the elected over the voters.<sup>43</sup>

Parliamentarism, which is only nominally related to the concept of “the rule of the people,” provides the apparently most accepted version of this model of decision-making. However, in theory and practice it perhaps is better categorized as a form of oligarchy<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *Detering Democracy*, especially pp. 365ff. See also Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion. With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis* New Brunswick (U.S.A.)/London, 1991.

<sup>42</sup> See *Democracy and Human Rights: Do Human Rights Concur with Particular Democratic Systems?* in Hans Köchler, *Democracy and the International Rule of Law*. Vienna/New York 1995, pp. 3ff.

<sup>43</sup> See Robert Michels, “Grundsätzliches zum Problem der Demokratie,” in “*Masse, Führer, Intellektuelle*,” *Politisch-soziologische Aufsätze 1906-1933*. Frankfurt/New York, 1987, pp. 183f.

<sup>44</sup> See in particular Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens*. Reprint, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Stuttgart, 1957.

because only group interests are fictitiously represented in the name of the whole.<sup>45</sup> For Noam Chomsky, the most decisive critic of the Western ideology of democracy, the concept of “democracy” means nothing more in the prevailing “political theology” than the “unhindered rule of the privileged elites”<sup>46</sup> in the name of the people. In the final analysis, democracy is nothing more than a form of “population control” for Chomsky.<sup>47</sup> The creation of consenting opinions and the “manufacture of consent”<sup>48</sup> in a manner which corresponds to the decisions of ruling elites is decisive. Even if some people tend to find Chomsky’s formulations exaggerated, the fact remains that citizens are deprived of their rights *de facto* in an exclusively representative system because they cannot exercise any direct influence on the decisions which immediately affect them. Furthermore, they are only regarded as competent insofar as they give representatives a “*general power of attorney*” which they, in turn, use to act without being bound to specific mandates. This doctrine of the exercise of power by representation has become the quintessence of Western political ideology: Liberal democracy, which is supposed to conform to human rights, allegedly cannot be realized in any other system outside of the parliamentary one. Forms of direct democracy are allowed at best as additions, complements, or ventilators; however, the democratic paradigm remains one of representation.

No further analysis is necessary to illustrate that the position represented by this form of opinion-building robs the citizen of every opportunity to articulate himself in the transnational realm. On the one hand, he can only express his will within a state through the mediation of a parliament (and, as a result, is *de facto* dependent upon political parties and economic pressure groups). On the other hand, in terms his dependence upon global constellations, his will is mediated once again by the state, which acts in his name and assumes, for example, legal obligations that are binding for each individual and have immediate consequences for his quality of life. This double mediation of the political will within the framework of the representative paradigm of democracy is further reinforced by the prevailing order of international law because only the state is recognized as a subject of international law, and the citizen, who is dependent upon the respective state to which he belongs in terms of the realization of his legitimate rights, is more or less at the mercy of that

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<sup>45</sup> With reference to the political system of the U.S.A., the sociologist C. Wright Mills has presented perhaps the most comprehensive analysis in his *The Power Elite*. London/Oxford/New York, 1956.

<sup>46</sup> *Deterring Democracy*, p. 365.

<sup>47</sup> *Deterring Democracy*, p. 369.

<sup>48</sup> Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 248.

state.<sup>49</sup> This dilemma I illustrated poignantly by the activity of the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights, which has not yet gone beyond archiving complaints and investigation reports about human rights violations. It is demoralizing to see that this commission—based upon the total mediation of the citizen as it is anchored in the UN Charter's doctrine of national sovereignty—only can bring itself to morally condemn human rights violators if they do not conflict with interests of power politics.

The doctrine of the state as the primary subject of international law is ideologically reinforced by the doctrine of representation, which provides the basis for liberal democratic theory and which implies that those mandated to exercise power respectively represent the people as a whole.<sup>50</sup> The legitimacy of the concept of the exercise of power through representation stands and falls with this fiction, which corresponds to the reification of the state in the doctrine of international law. Within a state, the leadership of the community is transferred to a privileged elite. According to the "liberal" conception, the people are unable to articulate themselves directly; therefore, the only alternative for the people is "to place its force at the disposal of a group of reasonable men" (Walter Lippmann).<sup>51</sup> Analogously in the international realm, a leading body has been created which fictitiously represents the totality of states and in which five states, which are privileged in terms of power politics, pretentiously claim to have universal responsibility for international security and for the maintenance of global peace. Although it is not admitted, we are dealing here with an elite theory, which in the final analysis only is supposed to obscure the fact that the respective interests of the permanent members of the Security Council determine the nature and scope of its actions—without, however, taking into account the interests of "mankind" which in reality does not exist any more than "the people." In both cases, we are dealing with useful fictions for the legitimation of the exercise of power. The permanent members of the Security Council, who deduce their "special responsibility" from their privileged position in 1945, therefore obstruct a genuine democratic renewal in the realm of international organization. In their efforts to maintain power, they find compliant apologists like Karl Popper, who falls back on normative terms like "civilized states"<sup>52</sup> whenever he wants to justify the classical doctrine of Eurocentrism.

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<sup>49</sup> See *Foreign Policy and Democracy: Reconsidering the Universality of the Democratic Principles*, here, pp. 18ff.; *The Principles of International Law and Human Rights*, here, esp. pp. 69f.

<sup>50</sup> This is dealt with at greater length in *Democracy and Human Rights*, here, pp. 3ff.

<sup>51</sup> According to the description of Noam Chomsky in *Deterring Democracy*, p. 367. Also see Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy*. London, 1955.

<sup>52</sup> See his remarks in the *Spiegel-Gespräch* quoted above: *Der Spiegel*, n. 13 (1992), p. 208.

An ideology of the best of all (political) worlds justifies the global claim to hegemony by the victorious powers of World War II, which is democratically completely unfounded: a theory which Popper presented earlier in discussion in Alpbach and now—as a philosophically unreflected concoction of Hegelian historical teleology—is propagated by Francis Fukuyama. Chomsky’s fundamental critique of democracy, which is substantially more philosophically consistent, identifies the liberal model as a form of advanced oligarchy that has resulted in a “subordination of the political and ideological system to business interests,”<sup>53</sup> whereas for Fukuyama “the *ideal* of liberal democracy could not be improved on.”<sup>54</sup> In this context, Fukuyama relies on a typical immunization strategy, which has been described variously by Critical Rationalism and can be observed with all prophets of salvation, including the ideologists of the “real socialism” which has failed in the interim: Shortcomings are attributed to an “insufficient realization” of the ideal (i.e. the fundamental principles of freedom and equality) which itself, however, cannot be improved. It is obvious that if the respective given order is treated as an absolute to this extent, then one is forced to construct a teleology according to which the development of political systems peaks in the shape of liberal democracy. In this context, Fukuyama proposes the thesis of a “coherent and directional history of mankind.”<sup>55</sup> As so many before him, Fukuyama actually commits the philosophically inexcusable mistake of eschatologically overestimating the spirit of the times, which forces him to make a number of ideological contortions and contrived constructions, when he maintains, for example, that “the world’s most developed countries are also its most successful democracies”<sup>56</sup> or “that liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically towards one another.”<sup>57</sup> The achievement of these kinds of theses is support—in some respects philosophical, although which a bad ideology—for the claims to power made by the U.S.A. and all other countries which view themselves as liberal democracies.

With his uncritical glorification of the liberal system, whose primarily oligarchical traits he does not even appear to recognize, Fukuyama operates at a level far below the one which European discussion about democracy have reached. Decades ago, a theorist of culture like Arnold Toynbee already pointed out that the effective functioning of a genuine democracy practically had been made impossible by “the increasing complication of affairs under the impulses of technology.”<sup>58</sup> It is clear for Toynbee that the parliamentary system as

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<sup>53</sup> *Deterring Democracy*, p. 375.

<sup>54</sup> *The End of History*, p. xi.

<sup>55</sup> *The End of History*, p. xii.

<sup>56</sup> *The End of History*, p. xv.

<sup>57</sup> *The End of History*, p. xx.

<sup>58</sup> *The Present-Day Experiment in Western Civilization*. London, 1962, p. 66.

we know it has more to do with oligarchy than with democracy.<sup>59</sup> Fukuyama and the other apologists of the liberal doctrine analyze the political system superficially because they only investigate the formal game rules and only abstractly treat the concrete social, economic, and cultural conditions, under which the electoral decisions are made. They cannot see—or do not want to see?—that specific electoral behavior is meaningless in terms of democracy if it is the result of material dependency or the manipulation of public opinion. In this manner, they lend themselves to false labeling by describing a specific manifestation of oligarchy with the term “democracy,” which as a value phrase has the characteristic function of legitimating and stabilizing a system of power. Furthermore, the thesis of the political incompetence of citizens—in the domestic and above all in the international sphere—and of the amorphous structure of the masses is employed to imply the need for structuring by a responsible elite: representatives (within states) or “civilized countries” (internationally).

In this manner, new power structures are created in the name of democracy (i.e. *de facto* oligarchy) which conjure up new confrontations between the “liberally” organized states of the North and the “undemocratic” and “underdeveloped” states of the South. The North-South conflict has replaced the East-West conflict as the framework for the violent settlement of conflicting interests. Military and political unipolarity increases the economic North-South division even further. The new wars are being fought in the name of democracy and therefore classified as “just wars.” Concrete economic interests can be conveniently hidden behind the ideology of the New World Order. It is no surprise that under these circumstances of a more or less discrete pressure to conform to the political system which is the most successful on a global scale, auxiliary legitimation is expected from philosophy. However, this is the kind of help philosophy, if it remains true to the tradition of critically investigating claims to power and committed to precise terminology, cannot provide.

#### **4. Transnational Democracy as an Alternative: The Idealistic Doctrine in Light of the Realism of Power Politics**

Talking about a New World Order only has a philosophically relevant meaning if it is accomplished by the introduction of a new paradigm in international relations. The slogan will remain an instrument for the realization of hegemonial claims as long as the attempts to create a post-communist order are based on using the means of the post-war order of 1945. It is only possible to speak of a new paradigm opposed to the traditional one of power politics,

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<sup>59</sup> *The Present-Day Experiment in Western Civilization*, p. 62.

which is oligarchical, if the concept of democracy is newly defined in the spirit of its original, literal meaning and is clearly distinguished from oligarchy. Everything else falls into the category of political rhetoric which is not even taken seriously by those who use it. The ideological reflection necessary for seeking a new order must above all take into account the status of man as an *autonomous subject*, as articulated in Kant's transcendental philosophy, and also as reflected in the basic understanding of human rights in UN Covenants.<sup>60</sup> Only in this manner can one liberate oneself from the ideological indoctrination propagated by the proponents of the dogma of representation, which is a democratically camouflaged legitimation of oligarchy.

This would make a reformulation of the central concepts of international law, such as sovereignty, possible. A radically democratic conception of sovereignty can only be of a deductive nature: It is founded in the autonomy of the citizens and the communal nature of their volition that initially lends the state legitimacy.<sup>61</sup> Only the subject-oriented premise, which results from the transcendental anthropology of human rights, can provide the normative framework for a transnational democracy within which the citizen is a world citizen—cosmopolitan—first of all and secondarily a member of a national or state community. Therefore, the individual is also an *immediate* participant in the world community and, due to the fact that the sovereignty of the state is deduced from his autonomous status, possesses primary sovereignty which makes him an immediate subject of international law. It is self-evident that this *idealistic* conception, in contrast to the prevailing contemporary realist theory of international relations, does not correspond to the current constitution of the United Nations in terms of international law, which is founded on the reification of the state as a collective subject. We are dealing here with the paradigm of direct democracy, which has been obfuscated for quite some time in European political history: a paradigm which provides the idea of popular sovereignty with its initial meaning. If one recognizes that democracy is something other than the exercise of power according to certain game rules within the framework of *representation*, that is, the *participation* of the citizen in decisions effecting the community (be that in the form of plebiscites or the imperative mandate, which along guarantees the freedom of the citizen, etc.), only then can one credibly propagate a *new* world order. Those who attempt to do so with the ideological instruments of oligarchy contribute directly to securing the respective power center's claims to hegemony over and against the nations which have been labeled as "non-democratic." Democracy

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<sup>60</sup> See *Democracy and Human Rights*, here, esp. pp. 5 ff.

<sup>61</sup> See the conception of the author in *The Principles of International Law and Human Rights*, here, esp. p. 76.



which, strictly observed, is not democracy at all is globally prescribed in the spirit of an ideological imperialism. The slogan of the New World Order therefore becomes an *empty formula* like so many other previous epochal slogans.

From the perspective of political philosophy, the designation “democracy” can only be justified if forms of *direct* democracy are taken into consideration (because everything else entails the disposition over the will of the autonomous subject in the final analysis). Democracy, which in this sense has been purified from the ideology of representation, must therefore not only be propagated globally as a domestic model but also be applied on the level of transnational relations if talk about a New World Order is to be justified.<sup>62</sup> However, this would require a complete reform of the Charter of the United Nations, which is politically much less possible in an epoch of monopolarity than in a bipolar system of competing spheres of influence such as those that characterized the post-war order. Under the current constellation, the democratization of the United Nations<sup>63</sup> will remain a slogan, albeit one that can motivate discussions and information campaigns which at least may contribute to unmasking traditional power politics based on the UN Charter.

The task of political philosophy is to draft an *alternative model* to the world order constituted by power politics and to question the global legitimation ideology. The New World Order would then be an alternative conception which is based on the paradigm of a) direct democracy and b) its universal application in the transnational realm. It would not create the misleading impression that we are living at the end history: a time in which the best of all (politically) possible worlds has been realized and therefore obedience to the authority, which represents and guarantees it (the global power as the protector of “liberal” democracy), is the highest command. This kind of remark sounds absurd but it unfortunately is justified in terms of the current constellation of power politics. The instruments of the United Nations have been placed *de facto* at the disposal of the member state which has singularly asserted itself as a superpower since the end of the Cold War, and thus even has allowed a militarily aggressive foreign policy to be poured into the framework of international law.

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<sup>62</sup> In his speech of January 20, 1977, President Carter already referred to this aspect of congruence between the norms of domestic and international action as the basic precondition for an international order of peace: “We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that this trust which our nation earns is essential to our strength.” Also see Rudolf Kirchschräger, “Ethik und Außenpolitik,” in *Philosophie und Politik. Dokumentation eines interdisziplinären Seminars*. Ed. Hans Köchler, Innsbruck, 1973, pp. 69-74.

<sup>63</sup> See *The United Nations and the New World Order: Keynote addresses from the Second International Conference On A More Democratic United Nations*. Ed. Hans Köchler, Vienna, 1992 and *Building A More Democratic United Nations: Proceedings of CAMDUN-1*. Ed. Frank Barnaby, London/Portland, 1991.

A closer analysis of the mechanisms of decision-making in a representative system shows that the respectively stronger particular interests are already victorious on a domestic level. The respective balance of power is nothing more than the parallelogram of forces that results from partial vested interests. In a representative system, which uses sophisticated public relations as a means of soliciting support, particular interests frequently are strengthened at the cost of the general interest. The articulation of the general interest is not rewarded in the “free” competition for votes. Because the objective is gaining power for the sake of represented interests, the political protagonists act, as a rule, with short-term plans. Within the context of such interests, it is not possible to deal with questions that go beyond short-term issues and that relate to the long-term planning necessary to secure the survival of the state, not to mention mankind.<sup>64</sup> This also excludes the genuine cosmopolitan attitude which would be necessary for the creation of democratic forms of international cooperation. The result of the free competition for the acclamation of the citizen is more or less accidental in its contents and dependent above all on the kind and dimensions of the resources employed. The mere addition of group interests, which is characteristic for the oligarchical system of economic liberalism which declares itself as parliamentary democracy, easily leads to situations in which “orientation is lost” and goal-oriented action and planning over longer time periods in a global context is not possible. An articulate testimony for this fact is the failure of the various international bodies to formulate binding ecological strategies for securing the quality of life, indeed the survival of future generations. Group interests could only be transcended in a system of direct democracy, if the framework conditions for its meaningful application (like, for example, free access to information) were given, because the citizen, provided that he decides freely, directly, and secretly, is not constrained in the least by “tactical considerations”—like the political functionaries as representatives of group interests are. The decision of the individual, e.g. in a plebiscite, does not fall into the category of tactical considerations with reference to election results and the privileges that accompany victory; it is the spontaneous expression of that which the citizen himself understands as his immediate interests in the respective community.

This means that a truly new world order has to be more than a “pattern of power relations among states”;<sup>65</sup> it must create the normative framework for the involvement of the citizen not only within the respective states but also with global political bodies. Discussion

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<sup>64</sup> See the reflections of the author in “Die Doktrin der Repräsentation und die Krise der westlichen Demokratie,” in *Philosophie—Recht—Politik*, pp. 61-73.

<sup>65</sup> See Silviu Brucan’s attempted definition in “The Establishment of a World Authority: Working Hypotheses,” in *Alternatives*, vol. 8 (1982), p. 219.

about a “democratization” of the United Nations is meaningful only in this context. The creation of a second chamber of directly elected mandataries from the individual population groups (in addition to the General Assembly as a representation of the states) would be a first symbolic step in this direction and is, according to Article 22 of the UN Charter, definitely possible.<sup>66</sup> In light of this background, the discontent with the forms of new hegemonial politics are assuming under the title of a more just world order<sup>67</sup> is justified. This frustration was particularly articulated by representatives of the Third World, most precisely by the foreign minister of Zimbabwe, at the Security Council Summit on January 31, 1992. The basic features of this order are defined by the hegemonial power of the West and executed selectively, using the procedural rules peculiar to the Security Council, according to its discretion.

Therefore, whoever propagates a new world order must first of all promote changing the UN Charter in a manner which eliminates the voting privilege of the permanent members and establishes a second “chamber of deputies” (which could be formed in analogy to the European Parliament, for example). This would create the prerequisites for a broader (direct) participation of the citizens in international decision-making in the distant future, whereby national sovereignty will be the decisive hurdle to be taken. In comparison, the propagation of the representative model in the name of a new world order, which is symptomatic for current superpower rhetoric, involves falling a step back in an era of political interests anchored in absolutely posited sovereignty: an era allegedly overcome after World War I.

The idealistic rhetoric, which is not only employed by politicians but also by intellectuals like Popper or Fukuyama, ultimately prevents serious reflection about the oligarchical foundations of the Western understanding of democracy and results in a premature, deceptive self-confirmation of the system which emerged from the struggle of the Cold War as the stronger system. The “intellectual flaw” inherent in the ideology of representation (insofar as it equates representation with autonomy) and the “systemic flaw” in the Charter of the United Nations (with regard to the privileged status of superpowers which allows them to annul democratic game rules) are further reinforced in this manner. In the name of democracy, a global taboo is placed on one power structure. The illegitimacy of

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<sup>66</sup> “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” See the proposal along these lines of the “Second International Conference On A More Democratic United Nations (CADMUN-2),” in Hans Köchler (ed.), *The United Nations and the New World Order: Concluding Statement*, Point 1.3, p. 50.

<sup>67</sup> See United Nations/Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the three thousand and forty-sixth meeting*, S/PV. 3046, January 31, 1992, pp. 121ff.

“hegemonial rule”<sup>68</sup> is interpreted away in the direction of a global responsibility for that political entity which maintains to represent a morally superior order. The United States’ claim to hegemony has been trimmed with the rhetoric of human rights and democracy since the eighties, and exactly this claim is responsible for turning the United Nations into an instrument for the realization of particular objectives of power politics.<sup>69</sup> James Petras identified here an attempt of the U.S.A. to change the rules of global power relations and coined the term “imperial revivalism”<sup>70</sup> to describe it. As far as the “enforcement actions” of the Security Council are concerned, one can justifiably ask whether, if the Gulf War is used as an example, the New World Order “can be found in war itself,”<sup>71</sup> i.e. in disciplining an insubordinate member state by force. As a matter of fact, the slogan has been most frequently used to date in order to justify aggressive policies (in military as well as in economic realms) toward countries of the Third World—and the Arab world, in particular, whereas one has refrained to a great extent from realizing the same legal principles in dealing with members of one’s own immediate realm of power and influence.<sup>72</sup> As a result, the “collective” actions of the Security Council are unavoidably imbued with the odium of coalition wars and arbitrary measures of reprisal.

The spirit of change invoked by the slogans quoted from the vocabulary of the New World Order is extremely misleading in terms of comprehending the structure of power politics. It deals with a “new beginning” using the old instruments of power politics. Do we nevertheless have to accept power politics in the robes of democracy and human rights as the decisive result of the East-West conflict? Does the ideology of the 21<sup>st</sup> century consist in, as Fukuyama suggests, the apotheosis of an intellectually foreshortened liberalism that only obfuscates the actual relationships of power and dependency to which the citizen is nationally and internationally subjected? A political program, which defines the position of the citizen as an autonomous subject in the New World Order—as a cosmopolitan in its initial meaning—has yet to be written. For the time being, one has to be content with combating “false consciousness” and with calling the things by their name: The *new* in the global (political)

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<sup>68</sup> According to Toshiki Mogami in “The United Nations as an Unfinished Revolution,” in *Alternatives*, vol. 15 (1990), p. 195.

<sup>69</sup> See S. Nanjundan, “A New World Order?” in *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 1-8, 1991, pp. 1389-1392. According to Nanjundan, the UN has “come under the virtual subjugation of the United States” (p. 1391).

<sup>70</sup> “Gulf War and the New World Order,” in *Economics and Political Weekly*, March 2-9, 1991, p. 482.

<sup>71</sup> According to Bruce Cumings in “Trilateralism and the New World Order,” in *World Policy Journal*, vol. 8 (1991), p. 196.

<sup>72</sup> In this context, the “New World Order” means a form of neocolonialism and the repression of the Third World’s quest for emancipation. In terms of realpolitik, this means “that the First World is content to unite against a restive Third World—to dominate it rather than accommodate its demands for a sharing of power and resources.” See Bruce Cumings, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

constellation after the end of the East-West conflict is the renaissance of *the old Eurocentric order* in the form of a practically unrestrained power claim of the U.S.A. as the leading power of the First against the Third World.<sup>73</sup> Regrettably, philosophy is only allowed to play an auxiliary role as a kind of “political theology”<sup>74</sup> that *eschatologically* legitimates the constellations of power politics. Like any system for the exercise of power, the new-old world order needs an ideology to secure the consent of the subjects it rules.

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<sup>73</sup> A commentary of American political scientists formulates an alternative vision whose idealistic character corresponds to the demand for a new world order in the spirit of multipolarity as formulated in section 2 above. Of central importance for this conception is a “constructive pluralism of debate and disagreement without enmity among a group of nations who can at least reduce the U.S.A. to something approaching *primus inter pares*.” (“Towards a New World Order?” [initials C.C., D.M.], in *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 62 [1991], p. 148.)

<sup>74</sup> See Noam Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, p. 365.